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Index:
The Problem
Legislative Initiatives
Sample Letters
Other Resources
The Problem:
"Is using secret, unexamined and untested software to tally votes in an election an improvement in election administration?" (John Washburn, VoteTrustUSA Voting Technology Task force
April 17, 2006)
Governments are installing computerized voting systems with no paper record to verify accuracy. Elections will be controlled by companies that do not allow voters to inspect their software. If vote counting becomes privatized, there may be no way to get it back. (http://www.invisibleballots.com)
“My greatest fear is that we won’t have a basis for trusting elections … every single election, there will be some question about who really won. And if you have a situation where in every election there’s a question … you lose the property where you’re governing with the consent of the governed.” (Dr. David Dill, Ph.D., Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, founder of VerifiedVoting.org)
"Invisible Ballots" shows how electronic voting poses an unprecedented threat to the foundation of our democracy. Interviews with politicians, activists, and computer scientists reveal the dangers, including poor security, haphazard coding, and lack of oversight. This is no big-budget documentary, but the quality and depth of the interviews make it a must-see for anyone concerned with the well-being of our democratic process. (Andrew Lovejoy, Video Review, yes! Magazine)
Locally, BCAD is making this dvd available for group or indivdual viewing; contact ballots@bcad.info. The film is also available through a free lending library set up by Joan Brunwasser, a self-described “mother of three, concerned citizen, and committed democrat.” Contact her at counteveryvote@gmail.com; read her blog at www.counteveryvote.blogspot.com.
Analysis Finds E-Voting Machines Vulnerable
Andrea Stone, USA Today, Monday 26 June 2006 -- Most of the electronic voting machines widely adopted since the disputed 2000 presidential election "pose a real danger to the integrity of national, state and local elections," a report out Tuesday concludes.
There are more than 120 security threats to the three most commonly purchased electronic voting systems, the study by the Brennan Center for Justice says. For what it calls the most comprehensive review of its kind, the New York City-based non-partisan think tank convened a task force of election officials, computer scientists and security experts to study e-voting vulnerabilities.
The study, which took more than a year to complete, examined optical scanners and touch-screen machines with and without paper trails. Together, the three systems account for 80% of the voting machines that will be used in this November's election. (read full article here.)
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Legislative Initiatives
Federal: HR 550 - Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005 -At the national level, Representative Rush Holt of New Jersey introduced the "Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act" (H.R. 550). Informaiton about this bill is accessible at thomas.gov. To date, there are 169 cosponsors (our own representative is NOT among them...)
As introduced, HR550 would
amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 with respect to: (1) voter verification and mandatory paper record audit capacity; and (2) accessibility and voter verification of results for individuals with disabilities.
To pass quickly, voter-verified paper ballot legislation must have strong bi-partisan support. VerifiedVoting.org provides an easy online form to send letter to your legislators to support 550.(click here for form!)
State: In Pennsylvania, legislation was introduced in the House (HB 2000) and Senate (SB977). However, those bills are going nowhere. As explained by Senator Madigan, for instance, "the State has not even approved a machine which provides a permanent paper record"!!!(emphasis added). Because of that, the Senate bill "was withdrawn from Committee consideration and it was agreed that the Committee will conduct a public hearing on the bill in the early part of this year." (see March 13, 2006 letter). The 'early part' has come and gone, but nothing has been done. It is up to YOU to protect your vote.
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Sample Letters to Editors
Very Secret Ballot John Kesich, Letter to Editor (Rocket Courier), April 5, 2006
Count My Vote Laura Blain, Letter to Editor (Towanda Daily Review), March 3, 2006
Very Secret Ballot
John Kesich, Letter to Editor (Rocket Courier), April 5, 2006 -- EDITOR: The Diebold voting machines Tioga and Bradford counties are getting redefine the phrase secret ballot.
The problem is that the voter is not allowed to verify the accuracy of the paper record of their vote.
Instead we must blindly trust that the machine has been properly programmed to correctly record our votes.
While HAVA effectively bans lever machines because they are not auditable, those charged with ensuring HAVA compliance are essentially letting the lever's electronic cousins produce ballot records on the honor system.
If you don't think our votes should be counted in secret by private companies with terrible records of violating election laws you are not alone. Recent polls found that 89.6% of likely Pennsylvania voters and 95% of the Association for Computing Machinery (the world's largest organization of computer professionals) think electronic voting machines (DREs) should produce a voter-verified paper trail.
So, why don't those responsible for certifying our election systems get it? Considering that Secretary Cortes chose to cherry pick one research paper which used dubious methodology to bolster his claim that DREs are highly accurate while ignoring the many papers and documented cases of problems, including a recent report from the GAO, the word agenda comes to mind.
Politicians wax poetic about our sacred right to vote and how people died so that we could enjoy it. The question before us is, will we surrender it without a peep, let alone a fight? To get involved in the effort to safeguard our elections, visit votePA.org and blackboxvoting.org.
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Count My Vote
Laura H. Blain, Letter to Editor (Towanda Daily Review), March 3, 2006 -- EDITOR: Last week, the county commissioners approved the purchase of new voting machines. In response to my question about a verifiable paper trail to protect my vote, we were told that each station provides a paper printout. This is NOT reassuring.
Have you ever had a computer glitch? There is no real assurance that the final printout will be accurate, and my vote or yours may be lost or miscounted. An electronic error on a computer will have a matching tally error on any printouts. With no other record, no paper ballots collected, there IS no verification possible.
While I don't believe our commissioners can be faulted for purchasing shiny new voting machines so they don't loose HAVA funding, this is being pushed too far, too fast, without adequate safeguards to insure our votes are accurately counted. ""There's no county or city government that would have the in-house staff with the necessary expertise" to test such complicated machinery..." (Scrutiny Of Voting Machines Limited, by David Cho, Washington Post, October 12, 2003) A quick internet search of WINvote machines, this county's intended machine, documents verified failures. (http://www.votersunite.org/info/WINvoteinthenews.pdf) So why is no one complaining? Have we all given up on democracy? Do you not care about your vote?
"Most of the voting systems being considered for purchase with HAVA funds rely on some form of electronic or computerized counting. Computers are wonderful for many things, but experience with these new voting systems so far shows that vote counting is not really one of them...Once a vote is lost from the electronic memory of a computer, it is gone forever - unless that vote has been protected by a Voter Verified Paper Ballot or a Voter Verified Paper Record. A VVPB or VVPR is basically a paper copy of the voter's choices, which he or she can see and approve before casting their final vote. Upon casting the vote, the paper goes into locked ballot box, where it is available for auditing or recount. In the event the audit or recount shows a discrepancy between the electronic tally and the paper, the voter-verified paper record must become the official record of the vote." (http//www.votepa.us/why.html)
Please urge our state officials (Representative Tina Pickett, and Senator Roger Madigan) to support passing HB 2000 & SB 977; and at the federal level, tell U.S. Congressional Representative Don Sherwood to support HR 550 AS WRITTEN, to insure a voter verified paper record or voter verified paper ballot for every vote. I want to KNOW my vote is counted!
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Other Websites/Resources
How can we Ensure Accurate Election Results? (2 page handout)
Where's the Paper Trail for Each Ballot Cast? Home of the Fraudulent Voting Machine ("... computer software can easily determine whether you are running a test or a real election...")
How Can Independent Paper Audits Detect and Correct Vote Miscounts?(3 page handout)
HAVA (Help America Vote Act), state site HAVA, along with accompanying legislation from the Pennsylvania General Assembly (Act 150 of 2002), seeks to bring a level of standard to the electoral process in Pennsylvania and across the United States in general. Note: the standards do NOT include verifiable voting.
HAVA, federal site: text of the law, A Guide to Acronyms, Dates for Specific Requirements, Duties and Responsibilities of the New United States Election Assistance Commission, Boards and Committees Established, Duties and Composition.
PA State Plan (as required by HAVA)
complaint procedure
UPDATE: A Closer Look at the E-Voting Lawsuit Filed against a PA County and U.S. Dept. of Justice By John Gideon, VotersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA, April 14, 2006
Primary elections calendar from Washington Post
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